Abstract This paper studies a spatial duopoly model where customers are located at nodes and the demand functions are given for each node. For any fixed location of two firms, we analyze Bertrand-Nash equilibrium and derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium. We present an algorithm to compute all equilibria, provided profit functions have a finite number of peaks. The algorithm terminates within polynomial time if the number of peaks is polynomial in the number of nodes.
Introduction
While the pricing is a key factor for a firm's success in general, it renders an interesting form of competition when the customers are spatially non-homogeneous. Examples include access points for an Internet service provider, depots for a parcel delivery firm, branches for a bank, etc., see Dewan et al. [3] . In this paper, we explore a price equilibrium problem in a spatial competition model.
Since Hotelling, in his celebrated 1929 paper [9] , presented the duopoly model, the spatial competition model has been studied successfully in economics. Hotelling examines the following duopoly model. The firms choose locations and compete in prices. The customers are distributed uniformly on a line. They pay the linear transportation cost and necessarily buy one unit of the product from the firm with the smallest sum of price and transportation cost. He analyzes a Nash equilibrium in prices (Bertrand-Nash equilibrium) given the fixed location of firms, and concludes that the equilibrium exists when firms locate close to each other, known as the "Principle of Minimum Differentiation". D'Aspremont et al. [2] however show no Bertrand-Nash equilibrium exists in Hotelling's original model unless the locations of the firms are relatively far apart, and point out that his conclusion is incorrect. Many extensions of Hotelling's original model have arisen thereafter. Economides [5] extends the duopoly model to a situation where customers are distributed uniformly on a plane. He proves the existence of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium for all symmetric locations of firms even if they are close to each other. Under more general distribution of customers' location and demand, Thisse et al. [12] and Zhang and Teraoka [13] examine a spatial duopoly model where the price discrimination is allowed. Other variations are explored by Anderson [1] and Rath [11] . For the review of the literature, the readers are referred to Gabszewicz et al. [6] .
From the operational viewpoint, it is more important to obtain numerical solutions in actual settings faced by firms while the economists analyze the basic mechanism of equilib-rium in relatively simple settings. A simple continuous model may yield various qualitative results, however, a discrete model is often more appropriate to formulate a complex situation. Dobson and Karmarkar [4] study the problem of locating facilities on a network in the presence of competition where customers are distributed at a finite number of nodes and the demands of customers are constant. Marianov et al. [10] formulate a hub location problem on a network in a competitive environment. Their works contribute to actual decision-makings through the numerical analysis in discrete models.
In this paper, we examine the Hotelling duopoly model from the operational view. We assume that customers are distributed discretely at n nodes on a plane and the demand functions are given for each node. These assumptions are not only useful in calculations, but they seem practical in many situations because cities are located discretely and unevenly in the real world. Since Economides employs a continuous model, he obtains a result only for a symmetric case. On the other hand, our discrete model enables us to obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in a general setting. Furthermore we present an algorithm determining whether or not equilibrium exist and finding all equilibrium prices of practical interest. Also obtained is the market area, that is the set of nodes captured by each firm at equilibrium. In particular, if the number of peaks in each profit function is polynomial in n, the algorithm terminates within polynomial time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our discrete spatial duopoly model based on Hotelling's original work, and formulates a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Section 3 gives the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium and the algorithm to compute equilibrium with an evaluation of the computational complexity. In Section 4, we summarize our findings.
The Model
Consider two firms A and B providing a homogeneous service. They have nonnegative constant marginal production costs c A and c B , and choose pricing strategies t A ≥ c A and t B ≥ c B , respectively. Customers are discretely located at nodes 1, 2, . . . , n. For each node k ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, let c kA > 0 and c kB > 0 be transportation cost per customer. Without loss of generality, let each node be numbered such that
* To exclude a trivial case, assume that there exists at least one node k
Customers' demand at node k is denoted by function q k (p k ). We make a reasonable assumption that q k is a nonnegativevalued, continuous and nonincreasing function of p k . In addition, we assume q k (c kA +c A ) > 0 and q k (c kB + c B ) > 0. Given t A and t B , we define the market areas of firms A and B as follows:
Firm A captures all customers located at node k ∈ Q A (t A , t B ) and firm B captures all customers at node k ∈ Q B (t A , t B ). We assume that firms A and B share customers located at node k ∈ Q AB (t A , t B ) at the ratio of α : 1 − α, where 0 < α < 1. With these notations, the profit functions of A and B are:
for π A and π B is defined as follows:
We now give two examples: Figure 1 describes locations of firms and customers. Circles correspond to firms and squares correspond to customers. Transportation costs between firm and customer are described in the figure. Let c A = c B = 1. We consider the BertrandNash equilibrium regarding the following two cases. Since the procedures to obtain equilibria are involved, we here show only an outline and relegate the details in Section 3.2. 1(b) . The demand function at node k is given by q k (p k ) = max(−p k + 20, 0). There exists no equilibrium in this case. This result is obtained as follows:
Following an argument similar to Example 1(a), a point (t * A , t * B ) = (9.5, 9.5) is the only candidate for the equilibrium. However, we have π A (8.5, 9.5) = 135 > 72.25 = π A (9.5, 9.5). Hence this point is not an equilibrium and there exists no equilibrium in this case. 
In this case, (t *
This result can be obtained by examining all candidates for the equilibria as in Example 1. Since the process is lengthy, we describe it in Section 3.2.
The Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium 3.1. The equilibrium condition
Unless ambiguity arises, we denote them hereafter as t
* , and j * . We obtain the following propositions. Table  1 . 
Proposition 3.1 Let t A ≥ c A and t B ≥ c B . The market is shared by the firms as in
We now define the following single-variable functions:
We now assume thatt 
: 
We are ready to state a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of BertrandNash equilibrium in our model. Figure 4) . Note that we require fairly weak assumptions regarding a demand function, as described in Section 2. We develop an algorithm for finding all equilibria (if any) based on Theorem 3.1.
The algorithm of finding equilibrium points
In this section, we present an algorithm to find equilibrium points. We assume that T i A and T i B (i = 1, . . . , n) are known and finite. Our algorithm can determine the existence of equilibrium and find all equilibria in which each firm earns a positive profit. Furthermore, not only the equilibrium prices but also market areas of both firms at each equilibrium are determined simultaneously.
The following notation is useful to describe the algorithm: 
FINDEQ
Step 0 E = ∅.
Step 1 ,t B ), (∅, N) ) to E. 4. If E = ∅, then go to Step 3. Otherwise, go to Step 4. If then add ((t A ,t B ), ({1, . . . , l}, {l + 1, . . . , n}) ) to E.
Step 4 All elements of E are equilibrium points, each representing both prices and the market areas of each A and B. If E = ∅, there exists no equilibrium in our model.
The flow chart of FINDEQ is described in Figure 5 . We note that Theorem 3.1 implies that an equilibrium arises only in T In what follows, we describe how the equilibria in Section 2 are obtained. Table 2 , so that ((t * A , t * B ), ({1}, {2})) is added to E from Table 2 . Hence, it is proved that (t * A , t * B ) is the unique equilibrium. Example 2. In this example, the sets of peaks are as follows: 289.3
Example 1(a). We have T
1 A = {t * A } = {1.5}, T 2 A = {t A } = {1.25}, T 1 B = {t B } = {1.25} and T 2 B = {t * B } = {1.5}. We first calculatet 1 A = 2 andtt A t A =t i A or t A ∈ T i A,t * B π i A (t A ) t B t B =t j B or t B ∈ T j B,t * A π j B (t B ) 1.5 t * A ∈ T 1 A,t * B 0.25 1.5 t * B ∈ T 2 B,t * A 0.25 2.5t 1 A 0 2.5t 2 B 0T 1 A = {32}, T 2 A = {34.5}, T 3 A = {35.7}, T 4 A = {33.5}, T 5 A = {31.6}, T 6 A = {25.5,
The computational complexity of FINDEQ
In this section, we evaluate the computational complexity of FINDEQ. Informally speaking, the "time complexity" of an algorithm is the maximum amount of time necessary for the algorithm to solve a problem instance of a specific size. A "polynomial algorithm" is the one whose time complexity is bounded by a polynomial function of the problem size. If the time complexity is not bounded by any polynomial function, then it is called an "exponential algorithm". As one may imagine, an exponential time algorithm is virtually intractable if the problem size is even modestly large. For more rigorous treatment for the topics, the readers are referred to the classic [7] . We now show that if the numbers of peaks |T The condition regarding the number of peaks is satisfied for a wide class of demand functions. In particular, if q k is given by q k (p k ) = max(q k (p k ), 0) where q k is strictly decreasing and concave, then eachπ 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we explore a spatial duopoly model which is an extension of Hotelling [9] . We assume that customers are discretely distributed at nodes and the demand functions are given for each node, while Economides [5] assumes that customers are uniformly distributed. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is derived, and the polynomial time algorithm to compute all equilibrium points is presented for a wider class of demand functions. Economides analyzes Bertrand-Nash equilibrium only for a symmetric location of firms, which is a convenient assumption reducing analytical difficulties. Our discrete model solves these difficulties and succeeds in obtaining results for more general settings.
Generally speaking, it is not easy to determine an existence of Nash equilibrium and compute the equilibrium points. For example, given a finite two-person game in normal form, it is not necessarily possible to determine within polynomial time whether there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the game, see [8] . Our algorithm solves both problems at the same time in polynomial time. This fact has a significant implication that the players themselves can easily determine a rational price strategy in a discrete spatial duopoly setting.
